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Visions of colonial Nairobi: William Simpson, health, segregation and the 
problems of ordering a plural society, 1907-1921 
 
Abstract: 
The 1915 Simpson Report made public health recommendations for Nairobi that 
were heralded as ground-breaking. Of particular interest to the colonial authorities 
was Professor Simpson’s suggestion to racially segregate Nairobi to prevent 
diseases said to emanate from its Indian bazaar. Rather than being novel, this 
article shows that these recommendations were typical of enthusiasm for 
segregation in other parts of Empire, as well as being in line with earlier health 
reform proposals for Nairobi. Furthermore, although public health justified racially 
discriminatory practices for European ends, this was not a predictable story of 
Indians uniting against segregation and Europeans campaigning for it. Indeed, the 
debates stimulated by Simpson reveal some disunity amongst Kenyan Indians. 
Additionally, when segregation plans were dropped in 1921 Indians continued to 
live in their own sub-communities in Nairobi, indicating that opposition to 
segregation was as much a symbolic political battle than a cultural necessity. 
 
Key Words: Simpson, Segregation, Indians, Public Health, Nairobi 
 2 
Colonial Kenya, with its healthy climate, rolling hills and big game hunting has 
captured popular imaginations. The celebrated ‘happy valley’ set of the 20s, 30s 
and 40s were regularly commemorated in fiction, histories and film, and it has only 
been in the last decade that a more sinister interpretation of European intervention 
in Kenya has begun to emerge.1 Rather than being the locus of carefree, if 
harmless, parties, members of the Kenyan white community were exposed as one 
of the most violently racist within the Empire.2 Kenya has been compared to 
South Africa in terms of its racial politics and, most recently, the violence and 
brutality that occurred at the end of the British colonial regime has been laid bare 
through the works of David Anderson and Caroline Elkins.3 
 
This reinterpretation of Kenya’s past has focused on the inequitable relationship 
between the white colonisers and their black colonial subjects, with less work 
analysing the diverse Kenyan Asian population, and even less addressing the 
                                                
1 Out of Africa, Universal Pictures, 1985; White Mischief, Columbia, 1987; Lord A. Cranworth, A 
Colony in the Making. Or Sport and Profit in British East Africa (London: Macmillan and Co., 1912); 
Elspeth Huxley, White Man’s Country: Lord Delamere and the Making of Kenya (London: 
Macmillan and Co.,1935); Elspeth Huxley, The Flame Trees Of Thika: Memories of an African 
Childhood, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1977) 
2 Chloe Campbell, Race and Empire: Eugenics in Colonial Kenya (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2007) 
3 David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: the Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (New 
York, London: WW Norton, 2005); Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: the Untold Story of Britain’s 
Gulag in Kenya (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2005); Caroline Elkins, Britain’s Gulag: The Brutal 
End of Empire in Kenya (London: The Bodley Head, 2014) 
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social history of the colony as a vibrant plural society.4 Historical accounts have 
concentrated on issues pertinent to, or from the perspective of, one community, 
unwittingly prioritising black/white binaries and rarely describing the complicated 
dynamics of multiculturalism that occurred consequent to colonialism.5 This is 
despite the fact that, from the early 1900s, black, brown and white people found 
themselves living in unaccustomed proximity in Kenya, meaning that the 
negotiation of space became an issue of pressing political concern, especially in 
the new urban centres. Furthermore, the negative implications of sharing 
residential spaces were often framed as a public health hazard, with Indians 
(conveniently categorised together) singled out as the most worrisome 
transmitters of disease. Segregation—literally dividing cities up into racial 
zones—was suggested as the best means to order Kenyan cities to counter the 
                                                
4 Recent exceptions include: Sana Aiyar, Indians in Kenya: The Politics of Diaspora, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2015); Anna Greenwood and Harshad Topiwala, Indian 
Doctors in Kenya: The Forgotten History (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). Other older studies have just 
looked at Europeans or Asians: Anna Crozier, Practising Colonial Medicine: the Colonial Medical 
Service in East Africa (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007); Dane Kennedy, Islands of White: Settler Society 
and Culture in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1939 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); 
Robert G. Gregory, South Asians in In East Africa: An Economic And Social History 1890-1990 
(Oxford: Westview Press, 1993); J.S. Mangat, A History of the Asians in East Africa, c.1886-1945 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969) 
5 The exception being Jonathon Glassman for colonial Zanzibar. Jonathon Glassman, ‘Slower 
than a massacre: the multiple sources of racial thought in colonial Africa’, The American Historical 
Review , 109.3 2004, pp.720-754; Jonathon Glassman, War of Words, War of Stones: Racial 
Thought and Violence in Colonial Zanzibar (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011) 
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perceived pathological threat presented by its Indian inhabitants.  
 
The focus of this article is a public health report published in 1915 by William 
Simpson that called for the segregation of Nairobi, particularly laying the blame for 
the poor public health situation of the city at the feet of the city’s relatively large 
and diverse Asiatic population. The Indian bazaar was singled out as the cradle of 
Nairobi’s disease problems, because of the alleged Indian tendency to live in 
crowded conditions with little attention to hygiene. Simpson’s Report on Sanitary 
Matters in the East Africa Protectorate, Uganda and Zanzibar, did not constitute 
anything more than a recommendation, but it nevertheless became an 
authoritative statement of medical expertise. Despite the fact that Simpson’s 
segregation plan was ultimately rejected, the report was regularly cited as 
exemplary, in both East Africa and the British parliament, until the 1930s.6 
 
In the medical history of colonial segregation, Maynard Swanson’s elucidation of 
the ‘sanitation syndrome’ is still as powerful now as it was forty years ago in terms 
of showing how discourses of public health were used to justify racially 
discriminatory town planning practices.7 Certainly, when examining the Simpson 
                                                
6 W.J. Simpson, Report on Sanitary Matters in the East Africa Protectorate, Uganda and Zanzibar, 
(London: HMSO, 1915). 
7 Maynard W. Swanson, ‘The Sanitation Syndrome: Bubonic Plague and Urban Native Policy in 
the Cape Colony, 1900-1909’, Journal of African History, 28.3, 1977, 387-410, p.387; See also: 
Maynard W. Swanson, ‘The Asiatic Menace’: Creating Segregation in Durban, 1870-1900’, 
International Journal of African Historical Studies, 16.3, 1983, 401-421. 
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Report, Swanson’s elucidation of the ‘sanitation syndrome’ in South Africa could 
be said to be applicable to Kenya—although few contributions to the scholarship 
have made the connection.8 However, while this article will show how the 
‘sanitation syndrome’ underpinned recommendations for the practical 
arrangement of Nairobi, it also aims to do something more. After providing the 
contextual setting describing colonial Nairobi and the content of the Simpson 
Report, the article will make three points. First, it will show that the Simpson 
Report contained few recommendations in it that were new. In fact, most of its 
content echoed recommendations made for Nairobi, almost a decade before, and 
were in step with public health recommendations throughout Empire.9  Second, it 
makes the point that power and decision-making did not always operate via 
racially predictable avenues during the colonial encounter. Instead showing how 
the segregation story, as it played out particularly in Nairobi amongst the 
European and Indian communities, exposes important racial nuances within 
colonial discourses that have hitherto largely been left unexplored.10 Third—and 
as a subsidiary point—the argument is made that for many Indians, fighting 
                                                
8 One of the few to discuss segregation in Nairobi is Godwin R. Murunga, ‘The Cosmopolitan 
Tradition and Fissures in Segregationist Town Planning in Nairobi’, Journal of Eastern African 
Studies, 6.3, 2012, 463-486 
9 George Bransby Williams, Report on the Sanitation of Nairobi (London: Waterlow, 1907) 
10 Murunga has provided a starting point on segregation in Nairobi but does not examine the 
Simpson Report, nor analyse what segregation represented beyond buttressing settler power via 
medical rhetoric. Godwin R. Murunga, ‘‘Inherently Unhygienic Races”: Plague and the Origins of 
Settler Dominance in Nairobi, 1899-1907’, in Salm and Falola, eds, African Urban Spaces, 98-130. 
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segregation was more a point of principle than necessity in terms of changing the 
way they lived. This insight provides important nuance when considering the 
political battles of the large Indian immigrant community, exposing the rifts 
between the way it rhetorically presented itself and the quotidian reality of its social 
arrangement. The final two points can act as a cautionary reminder to historians of 
the problems inherent in grouping people of shared skin colour together in terms of 
social and political responses, or assuming that publically articulated rhetorical 
stances necessarily reflect lived experiences on the ground. 
 
Kenya and Nairobi before 1921: 
To set the scene for Simpson’s segregation plans it is necessary to describe 
colonial Kenya generally and Nairobi specifically. Kenya, known as East Africa 
Protectorate until 1920, was taken over by the British Imperial East Africa 
Company in 1888 and came under British Government rule in 1895. The country 
was regarded as a prime location for British expansion, with a more temperate 
climate than West or Central Africa, good trading connections via the Indian 
Ocean with the Indian subcontinent, and relatively good land for agriculture. 
 
As few early statistics exist it is difficult to accurately enumerate the demographic 
constitution of Kenya during its first decades under British rule, although certainly 
by 1910, the urban centres and the Swahili coastline were cosmopolitan in 
character. From 1900 Europeans were systemically encouraged to move to Kenya 
through an attractive land grant scheme, to the extent that by 1920 ‘practically all 
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land in Kenya capable of cultivation’ had passed into European ownership.11 It 
was through this incentivisation that many prominent figures came to live in Kenya, 
such as the life peer Lord Delamere who, during the first two decades of Kenyan 
colonial history, became the most vocal defender of white settler rights.  
 
Early figures for settlement vary, but the 1921 census estimated that the European 
population of Kenya was 9,651, about a third of whom lived in Nairobi or its 
suburbs. Situated against the indigenous African population, this community was 
tiny (‘no more equal to the population of a large street in a European city’) despite 
the proportion of political influence wielded by the British.12 It was perhaps 
precisely because of European anxieties over their dominance that, during the first 
half of the twentieth century, the European settler community became one of the 
most vocally racist of the British imperial communities.13 
 
Added to the small, but growing, European population was a larger, and more 
rapidly growing, Indian one. Indians had been immigrating to Kenya with 
increasing regularity since 1895 and, although no official census was taken of the 
                                                
11 Norman Leys, Kenya (London: The Hogarth Press, 1924), 140-141. It is worth noting that Leys 
was talking specifically of the Kenyan Highlands and there was much cultivatable land in Kenya not 
in western hands, so this statement is on face value more dramatic than the reality. 
12 Ibid., 140 
13 Campbell, Race and Empire; see also Will Jackson, Madness and Marginality: The Lives of 
Kenya’s White Insane, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013) who shows that 
economic vulnerability accounted for some of the radical positions of the white settlers. 
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Indian population during the first decades of British rule, estimates place the 
population as growing from under 5,000 in 1895 to over 90,000 in 1948.14 Most of 
the Indians were traders, artisans or lower level administrators but educated 
professionals, particularly doctors and lawyers, also joined the migratory cohort. 
Initially, the British government had actively promoted Indian settlement in Kenya, 
claiming the Indian community to be ‘friendly, loyal and helpful to Government’ and 
stressing the benefits of Indian residency for the local economy and also in terms 
of easing population pressures in India.15 This supportive stance became 
progressively eroded, however, through the accession to the Governorship of a 
series of leading administrators who favoured the views of ‘energetic and 
aggressive’ anti-Indian European settlers (many of whom owned land in or around 
Nairobi) such as Lord Delamere, Lord Francis Scott and Colonel Ewart Grogan.16 
The articulation of growing anti-Indian resentment came to a head after World War 
One when a damning report on the economic condition of the colony was 
published. The authors recommended, amongst other things: a complete halt to 
                                                
14 Greenwood and Topiwala, Indian Doctors in Kenya, 24 
15 British Library (hereafter BL) /IOR/L/PJ/6/1729 file 266 August 1918-March 1925 Policy of Race 
Segregation throughout British East Africa, Report of a Speech by Mr John Ainsworth, Chief 
Commissioner of Native Affairs in East Africa, Extract from Bombay Chronicle, 2 September 1920; 
Frederick D. Lugard, Rise of Our East African Empire (London: Blackwood and Sons, 1893) cited 
in Robert G. Gregory, India and East Africa: A History of British Race Relations within the British 
Empire, 1890-1939 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1971), 49-50 
16 BL/IOR/L/E/7/1263 Indians in Kenya: Some Correspondence with Mr A.M. Jeevanjee of the 
East African Deputation, Letter from A.M. Jeevanjee to Viscount Milner, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 4 August 1920 
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Indian immigration, the severe limitation of Indian representation in local 
government, and the debarment of Asiatics from jobs in the higher grades of the 
civil service.17 This indictment coincided with the growing political rhetoric that 
declared the expansion of African rights as the first duty of the post-World War 
One colonial government. While this seemed to signal progress for the African 
majority, the new vision of racial priorities paid no heed to the complex plural 
society of Kenya and factored no place in its newly racially inclusionist plans for 
expanding Indian rights.18 The crescendoing of anti-Indian attitudes finally 
culminated in the 1923 Devonshire Declaration, which formally denied Kenyan 
Indians enfranchisement.19  
 
Nairobi: 
In 1899 Nairobi started its life as a temporary railway depot located in a marshy 
central position along the line of the Uganda Railway, which the British were due 
to build from Mombasa, on the Kenyan coast, to the shores of Lake Victoria in 
Uganda. It was a direct corollary of this massive railway project that the site 
                                                
17 BL/IOR/L/PJ/6/1718 Appointment of Commission by H.C. Belfield, Economic Commission 
Report (Nairobi: Swift Press, 1919). 
18 Greenwood and Topiwala, Indian Doctors in Kenya, 117-120. 
19 BL/IOR/L/E/7/1263 Indians in Kenya: Letter from A.M. Jeevanjee to Viscount Milner, Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, 4 August 1920. On the ‘Indian question ‘see: Diane Wylie, ‘Confrontation 
over Kenya: The Colonial Office and Its Critics, 1918-1940’, Journal of African History, 18.3, 1977, 
427-447; Christopher P. Youé, ‘The Threat of Settler Rebellion and the Imperial Predicament: The 
Denial of Indian Rights in Kenya, 1923’, Canadian Journal of History, 12, 1978. 
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quickly became home to a large number of Indian indentured labourers.  
 
In public health terms, Nairobi was a surprising location for a new capital. The site 
was notoriously swampy (with mosquitoes in alarming evidence), and Nairobi’s 
remote inland location meant connections to other parts of the country were poor. 
Colonial governors were so concerned about the issue that, between 1902 and 
1906, they commissioned a series of reports investigating whether the capital 
should be moved, given its unhealthy location. After extensive debates, it was 
finally decided in 1907 that the re-siting of the capital would be ‘outside the bounds 
of practical politics’ and was therefore undesirable.20 The issue continued to 
prompt debate until the 1930s.21 
 
Nairobi officially became the seat of the British government in 1905, meaning that 
it was home to the Governor who ran the country under the direction of the 
Colonial Secretary in London with the help of his local Legislative and Executive 
Councils. Since 1901 the Nairobi Municipal Council (known until 1919 as the 
Nairobi Township Community) was additionally convened to decide on city 
management. Although there was no direct African representation of any of the 
governing councils until 1946, provision was made for the Governor to nominate 
                                                
20 Williams, Report on the Sanitation of Nairobi, 2-4, 4. 
21 R. Ward, Letter to the Editor, ‘The Nairobi Swamp’, The East African Standard, 29 September 
1934, 34; K.V. Adalja, Letter to the Editor, ‘The Nairobi Swamp’, The East African Standard, 29 
September 1934, 34-35; ‘The Malaria Menace to Nairobi’, The East African Standard, 8 May 1935, 
33. 
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one or two Indians to the Legislative Council prior to 1924 and one member to the 
Executive Council from 1920 onwards. Indians gained the right to have elected 
representatives for the first time in 1924, but boycotted the elections on grounds of 
their lack of parity with Europeans as affirmed in the 1923 Devonshire Declaration.   
Indians had also had been granted limited representation on the Nairobi Municipal 
Council, although because they were ‘dissatisfied with the proportion of seats 
offered to them’ it was said that they regularly ‘refused to sit’: a decision which 
harmed Indian representation during the crucial debates that occurred between 
1919 and 1924.22  
 
On the other side of the political spectrum, European officials and settlers 
dominated local and national political affairs from Nairobi. They made up the 
majority on the governing councils and the settlers, additionally, founded their own 
Nairobi-based representative group: the Planters’ and Farmers’ Association. By 
1905 the association was re-modelled as the Colonists’ Association with Lord 
Delamere as President.23  
 
This is not to say that the Indian community was politically lethargic. The first 
Indian Association was founded in Mombasa in 1900 and, in 1914, the East 
African National Congress (EAINC), was founded by Alibhai Mulla Jevanjee 
                                                
22 S.H. La Fontaine (with J.H. Mower), Local Government in Kenya: its Origins and Development 
(Nairobi, Dar es Salaam and Kampala: The Eagle Press, 1955), 32. 
23 Ibid. 
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(1856-1936).24 Jevanjee became noteworthy in the segregation story as the lead 
voice in the EAINC campaign against Simpson’s proposals. Although this paper 
shows that Indians were not always united, ‘Indians’, despite caste, professional or 
religious differences, did organise themselves under this general collective 
category when it proved to be politically expedient to do so. 
 
Thus two, albeit unequal, factions emerged in the political landscape of young 
Nairobi, with the third, and largest, group—Africans—largely politically silent 
because few had the education or training to effectively challenge medical and 
legal arguments advanced by the colonial administration. This racial dynamic was 
reflected in the urban arrangement in the new city. Africans were brutally 
discriminated against in Nairobi town planning, not least as no formal provision 
was made for any African housing in Nairobi before 1919.25 There were some 
examples of Africans owning property on the outskirts of Nairobi, but these were 
                                                
24 W.M. Ross, Kenya From Within: A Short Political History (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1927), 
167 
25 The inability of the Africans to be heard in town planning decisions is evidenced by the secret 
and forced removal of the Somali village in 1917 from Ngara, near central Nairobi, by Medical 
Officer Clearkin. This event, undocumented in the historiography, illustrates how enforced 
evacuation was used as the most effective remedy for plague, putting the clearance of the Indian 
bazaar into context. Rhodes House Library, Oxford MSS.Brit.Emp.r.4 Peter Alphonsus Clearkin, 
Ramblings and Recollections of a Colonial Doctor 1913–58, Book I, (Durban: unpublished, 1967), 
103-109. In contrast, important work on the agency of some urban Africans in Nairobi has been 
uncovered by Luise White, The Comforts of Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi, (Chicago, 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1990)	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exceptional cases, usually after the 1920s.  In the early period before World War 
One, despite the lack of official support, the African population of Nairobi was 
estimated at about 12,000 ‘temporary residents’ (a group which included servants 
and prostitutes).26 Although a numerically much smaller group, more space—and 
nicer space—was given to the European residents of Nairobi, while Indians 
operated in a middle space: regarded as socially above Africans, but inferior to 
Europeans. Pragmatically recognising their importance in the economics of the 
city, those classed as Indian were allowed to own business premises in Nairobi’s 
commercial area, although they were not allowed to live in the ‘choicer, higher and 
more extensive’ areas open only to Europeans. As contemporary commentator 
Norman Leys pointed out: the 2,235 Europeans living in Nairobi had a generous 
2,700 acres in which to arrange themselves, whereas in the Indian Bazaar ‘some 
4,300 souls, the great majority of them Indians, live on a space of seven acres.’ As 
pointed out by the Goan Councillor, Campos, in 1920, it was no small irony that 
Indian Nairobi residents paid higher taxes and yet had considerably less space 
and sanitary infrastructure.27 Nor was it coincidence that the act of moving the 
Indian bazaar would open up highly profitable land in a key central Nairobi location, 
for development.  It is against this dynamic multicultural context, negotiating 
rights and space within the new urban capital of Nairobi, that Simpson’s report was 
borne. 
                                                
26 Norman Leys, Kenya, 272-273; The Nairobi city map at the end of the Simpson Report shows 
the African area on the North Eastern periphery of the city. Simpson, Report on Sanitary Matters in 
East Africa, 54. For lives of prostitutes see White, The Comforts of Home 
27 Ibid., 270-272 
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Nairobi, public health and the 1915 Simpson Report: 
Despite his prominence at the time, little has been written about the role of William 
John Simpson (1855-1931) in drafting some of the most influential urban public 
health proposals within the British Empire.28 The East African report was 
commissioned by Henry Belfield, Governor of Kenya (between 1912-17), under 
pressure from the Colonial Office to take assertive action towards the public health 
crisis that threatened the colony. Professor of Hygiene at King’s College London, 
Simpson was well known to the Colonial Office as a sanitary expert, having 
undertaken numerous health surveys of other British dependencies such as 
Calcutta, South Africa, Hong Kong, Singapore and the Gold Coast.29 
By the time of Simpson’s appointment in 1914, public health issues in Nairobi were 
critical. One Medical Officer, Bertham Cherrett, described the city as ‘a huge evil 
smelling swamp’, thereby pithily summarising concerns regularly voiced since 
1900.30 Significantly, in terms of the emphasis of this paper, Indians loomed large 
                                                
28 A little has been written about Simpson’s Calcutta experiences by Mark Harrison, Public Health 
in British India: Anglo-Indian Preventative Medicine, 1859-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 213-18. See also: Greenwood and Topiwala, Indian Doctors in Kenya, 79-82. 
29 W.J. Simpson, Cholera in Calcutta in 1894 and Anti-Choleraic Inoculation (Bengal: General 
Government Report, 1895); W.J. Simpson, Hong Kong: Report on the Causes and Continuance of 
Plague in Hong Kong, and Suggestions as to Remedial Measures (London: Waterlow, 1903). W.J. 
Simpson, Report on the Sanitary Condition of Singapore (London: Waterlow, 1907); W.J. Simpson 
Sanitary Matters in Various West African Colonies and the Outbreak of Plague in the Gold Coast, 
(London: HMSO by Darling and Son, 1909) 
30 BL/IOR/L/E/7/1263 Letter from Dr Cherrett to Nairobi Town Clark, 6 October 1913 
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from the beginnings of the city in terms of the blame that was laid at their feet for 
public health crises. As early as 1900, a report by Colonel T. Gracey of the 
Whitehall-based Railways Committee, revealed shock over the squalor in which 
the railway working communities lived. Gracey’s call for the improvement of the 
housing, sanitation and drainage of Indian residential areas was the first formal 
statement of the public health needs of the colony specifically focussing on one 
racial group.31 The trend continued, however, and two years later, a government 
medical officer described the site of Nairobi as being one of ‘total unsuitability’, 
particularly the area where the Indian railway subordinates resided.32 
 
The colony’s first major outbreak of plague in 1902 further bolstered the growing 
connection made between Indians and disease in Nairobi. Although not large by 
epidemic standards, the 1902 plague outbreak resulted in sixty-nine cases, the 
majority of whom died (between 50-60), and was a prominent enough event to 
worry the colonial authorities.33 Plague had long associations with India, so it was 
in keeping with popular expectations when its origins in Nairobi were directly 
traced to the bazaar. Perhaps ironically, it was an Indian, Rosendo Ribeiro (one of 
the first Goan doctors in Kenya), who notified the authorities that the Indian Bazaar 
                                                
31 Cd. 670, Correspondence respecting the Uganda Railway, 1901, Report by Colonel Gracey on 
the Uganda Railway, 14. 
32 Wellcome Library Archives (hereafter WLA) MS 6807/24 Dr Sieveking, Dr W Radford, Dr D.L. 
Falkener and Dr A Spurrier, Report on the Sanitary Aspect of the Site of Nairobi Township, 1902 
33 Williams, Report on the Sanitation of Nairobi, 3 
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housed the Nairobi plague.34 The ever racially divisive Governor, Charles Eliot, 
was quick to seize on this information and publically blamed Indian bazaar traders 
for its spread, further cementing associations that were to endure throughout the 
colonial period.35 
 
The situation was so bad that in 1902, Medical Officer, Alfred Spurrier, ordered 
that the street on which the Indian bazaar was situated be burned down. The 
blame Spurrier attributed to the Indian community was unambiguous. The bazaar, 
he stated, ‘reproduced the worst features of an old densely crowded city of the 
East’ and housed ‘hundreds of people of most uncleanly habits who loved to have 
things so, and were so let’.36 
 
It is in this context, explicitly blaming Indian urban residents for the spread of 
disease, that the Colonial Office in London declared their urgency to obtain ‘the 
services of an expert authority on tropical sanitation, who could visit the 
Protectorate and examine on the spot the grave problems’ faced by the local 
                                                
34 A.D. Milne, ‘Memorandum on the History of the Plague in the East African Protectorate’, 
Appendix I in Simpson, Report on Sanitary Matters in East Africa, 77-79, 77. 
35 Cd. 1626, Report by His Majesty’s Commissioner on the East African Protectorate, London, 
HMSO, 1903, 13; Simpson, Report on Sanitary Matters in East Africa, 22; the Indians’ ‘incurable’ 
repugnance to hygiene was officially articulated in BL/IOR/L/PJ/6/1718 Economic Commission 
Report, Nairobi, Swift Press, 1919, 21 
36 Simpson, Report on Sanitary Matters in East Africa, 22-23. 
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administration.37 Simpson, whose six-month visit it was estimated would cost 
£1,500, was expensive to employ, but this expense was considered justified 
because of his similar commission to Ghana in 1908, which had been celebrated 
for its successes in facilitating a ‘striking improvement in the health of the 
European community’ there. Simpson was also regarded as ‘one of the foremost 
authorities on bubonic and pneumonic plague’ which had clear relevance for 
Kenya.38 
 
Recently turned 60 when he arrived in East Africa, Simpson’s brief was broad. He 
was to assist ‘the local government with his advice’ and to report on ‘the form 
which the sanitary policy should take’.39 Over the course of his trip, Simpson 
made ‘exhaustive enquiry into the towns of Mombasa, Nairobi, Nakuru and 
Kisumu and visited other important commercial and governmental sites with the 
Principal Medical Officer.40  
 
The report extended to almost a hundred pages, including extensive appendices, 
and laid out Simpson’s vision and recommendations for a healthier East Africa. To 
move forward in public health Simpson recommended four main changes, namely: 
the establishment a Sanitary Board, the drafting of a new Public Health Ordinance, 
                                                
37 National Archive (hereafter NA)/CO/533/117 Colonial Office, Kenya Original Correspondence, 
Despatches, Memo Colonial Office to Treasury 15 March 1913 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Annual Medical Report East Africa Protectorate, (Nairobi: Government Printers, 1913), 18. 
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the appointment of Government executive officers to administer the townships of 
Mombasa and Nairobi and, firmly and unequivocally, the need for residential 
segregation between European, Asiatic and African races.41  
 
Segregation, as presented in the Simpson Report, was a progressive measure, 
one that should be implemented ‘in the interest of each community’.42 Its efficacy 
was premised, Simpson argued, on two central arguments in the public interest. 
Firstly, dividing dwellings by race created a situation that was more convenient for 
people of diverse cultural habits. As he expressly stated: ‘it has to be recognised 
that the standard and mode of life of the Asiatic do not ordinarily consort with the 
European, whilst the customs of Europeans are at times not acceptable to the 
Asiatics.’43 Secondly, the arrangement was presented as a fundamental to reduce 
disease transmission and therefore was key for the health of the colony. The 
scheme was simple: 
 
‘in every town and trade centre the town planning should provide 
well defined and separate quarters or wards for Europeans, Asiatics 
and Africans…and that there should be a neutral belt of open 
unoccupied country of at least 300 yards in width between the 
European residences and those of the Asiatic and African.44  
                                                
41 Simpson, Report on Sanitary Matters in East Africa, 9 
42 Ibid., 53 
43 Ibid., 9 
44 Ibid., 9-10 
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The diseases that were to be prevented through this zoning were named as 
dysentery, malaria, yellow fever and smallpox, although it is noteworthy that they 
were superficially mentioned with no supportive discussion presented of how 
medical research into their transmission directly supported the policy. The link 
between zoned city planning and public health was presumed medically robust 
and non-contestable, without the need for supporting evidence.45  
 
In accord to dominant discourses, the report identified the Indian bazaar as the 
font of Nairobi’s ill health. Simpson explained how this market place was 
problematic because of Asiatic ‘habits of overcrowding and uncleanliness’.46 The 
solution Simpson recommended was that the bazaar should be ‘demolished and 
removed’.47 Notably the report, although advocating segregation for African 
people too, made less detailed comments about Africans’ apparent public health 
threat. Africans were actually characterised as ‘cleanly’ in contrast to the 
‘constitutionally unclean Asiatic’.48 
 
                                                
45 J. W. Stephens and S. R. Christophers, ‘The Segregation of Europeans’ in Royal Society of 
London, Reports to the Malaria Committee, (London: Royal Society, 1900-03); S.R. Christophers 
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Despite Simpson’s grand claims for the universal benefit of his segregative policy, 
his pro-European priorities were barely disguised. Simpson explicitly blamed the 
‘pouring’ in of Indians into the country as a key reason why town planning needed 
such attention. Segregation, Simpson tellingly revealed, would be ‘for the 
European the…first essential in any town planning scheme’.49 There was no 
equivalent rhetoric justifying it in terms beneficial to the Indian community. With 
the right management, Simpson hoped Nairobi could become a beacon 
‘ European town’ at the centre of a ‘European district in the highlands’.50  
 
The economic benefits these changes would bring to the European community 
were also barely hidden. When explaining the need to remove the bazaar to the 
edge of the city, Simpson revealingly mentioned that this action would free up ‘one 
of the best situations in the commercial part of Nairobi.’51  There was no 
consideration of using the salubrious European areas of the Hill or Parklands for 
Indian use. What-is-more, after demolition and clearance, the land that had 
housed the bazaar could then be ‘included in the European area.’52 A few of the 
houses ‘belonging to Indians of a better class’ would be allowed to remain, but the 
majority of Indian traders were to be relocated to areas on the outskirts of the city. 
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In Simpson’s utopian Nairobi, the city would to be split into areas North and South 
of the river—with Indians located in the North, particularly near Ngara and Kiambu 
Roads and European residences and business quarters on the South side. Any 
existing shops, houses or offices belonging to Indians in the European area would 
be allowed to remain so long as they were of ‘a high-class character.’53 Simpson 
revealed his vision for a Europeanised Nairobi, stating that: ‘Such an arrangement 
gives the only chance for the unfettered expansion of the European quarter if 
Nairobi is going to become the large and important city that it promises to be.’ 
Furthermore, he warned, time was short. If the colonial government did not act 
with urgency then the Asiatic population would only increase and the plan 
undertaken later would be ‘much more difficult and costly’.54  
 
Precursors to the Simpson Report: 
The report, since described as Simpson’s ‘most sophisticated defence of 
residential segregation yet’ was presented at the time of its authorship as 
heralding a sea change in the public health of East Africa. Simpson himself 
claimed that it marked the ‘inauguration of a new policy in health matters’.55 The 
colonial government was also very pleased with its recommendations, citing it as 
the basis of segregation’s first dramatic entry into the legislature of East Africa with 
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the proposal of the 1918 Segregation of Races Act. However, contextually 
analysed, the Simpson Report seems far less novel than its supporters claimed.  
Not only did it play into an established local link, which blamed the Indian 
community for disease, it also fitted in with broader discursive trends throughout 
the British Empire.56 The language of public health was one of the few socially 
acceptable ways whites could justify their behaviour against other races, so in 
those terms, it was a well-rehearsed and predictable language.57 Furthermore, 
most of the advice within the report was entirely in keeping with recommendations 
Simpson had made for other colonial dependencies, most notably echoing a 
stance he had championed four years earlier in Accra in 1909.58  
 
Most powerfully countering these claims to originality, this was not the first official 
investigation into the public health of Nairobi. In fact, in 1906 a well-respected 
Welsh civil engineer and sanitary advisor, George Bransby Williams (1872-1954) 
had already been commissioned to undertake an extensive investigation into 
Nairobi’s public health.59 The similarities between the recommendations made in 
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Williams’ Report on the Sanitation of Nairobi, 1907 and those made by Simpson 
eight years later are striking. Both reports drew on expert advice contracted by 
London, and both reports were based on evidence garnered via a six-month tour 
of the East Africa Protectorate. Additionally, both Williams and Simpson had the 
same mandate (even if Simpson’s was country-wide and Williams was just for the 
capital): namely to make economically feasible suggestions to improve sanitation. 
Both made substantive recommendations to improve the drainage and sewerage 
of Nairobi and both stressed the need for public health legislation.  
 
Foreshadowing Simpson, Williams targeted the Indian Bazaar as the seedbed of 
Nairobi’s public health headaches. The ‘offensive, overcrowded and unsanitary’ 
bazaar, in Williams’ estimation, was in ‘so unsanitary a state as to be a constant 
menace to the health of the public’.60 Williams specifically labelled other Indian 
sites as problematic –namely the railway, the military lines (which would have 
included a large number of Indian Sepoys) and the residential area of the Dhobi 
(Indian washer-men). By way of contrast, Williams described the European 
suburban district of Parklands as the healthiest and most pleasant district of the 
city.61 Furthermore, when he pinpointed the Indian community and advocated the 
removal of the bazaar (for the second time, given it had already been re-sited in 
1902), Williams was reiterating suggestions that had come from doctors within the 
colonial medical department. Clare Wiggins (served Kenya 1901-1909), one of the 
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more liberal Europeans, had been particularly vocal in this regard, although his 
proposals were never taken up because they were claimed to be too costly.62  
 
A close reading of the language European experts used to describe the poor 
health of the bazaar is indicative of colonial reasoning at the time. The fact that the 
Indian bazaar was such a prominent harbourer of disease was not, the authorities 
contended, because the government had failed to properly invest in its sewerage 
and drainage infrastructure. Rather, the situation was explained in the light of 
innate cultural faults existing within Indians themselves. The purported greed of 
Indian property owners became a particular common point of explanatory 
reference when the bazaar’s poor sanitary state was described, with blame put on 
the Indian propensity to sublet their properties. It created a situation where tenants 
were ‘compelled to pay an exorbitant rental for insanitary and undesirable 
accommodation.’63 
 
In short, Indian landlords crammed tenants into their accommodation with 
disregard to hygiene and sanitation. Furthermore, when plague, or other 
communicable disease, was discovered, Indians circumvented the law and social 
decency by concealing the fact ‘as long as possible’, rather than reporting it as the 
authorities requested.64 This, Simpson had explained, was because ‘secretive 
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and cunning’ Indians were fearful of the damage disease notification would have 
on their trade.65 Even when a new bazaar was laid out after the 1902 plague, 
European distain towards these allegedly innate characteristics was evident: 
Williams had reported his worries that Indians, like children, could not be trusted to 
look after themselves, unless ‘under constant supervision’.66 In a similar vein, 
Medical Officer Haran expressed his disappointment that within eight years of the 
bazaar’s relocation ‘the genius of its inhabitants has largely converted it into a 
mass of sublet shanties and unsavoury open cesspools.’ 67 Conveniently, 
European commentators made no mention that subletting was actually 
encouraged through the residential and ownership restrictions that were placed on 
Nairobi land. Restrictions, furthermore, that confined Indians to a small acreage of 
city space, forcing people to live together under one roof.68 
 
Money also lay at the heart of European impulses. When the first bazaar was 
burnt down the colonial government ‘laid out on a new site on sanitary lines’ but 
quickly regretted their choice of location for the new market. The new spot was 
sited in a central position (on the south-west side of Government Road) in what 
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was to become the main business area of Nairobi.’69 This was acknowledged as a 
prime location and therefore became the focus of many struggles to implement 
visions of town planning that sought to move the bazaar again. William’s saw what 
had happened quite clearly: the new bazaar occupied ‘land that will be badly 
wanted for the European business quarter’ and furthermore was so central that it’s 
presence acted as ‘a depreciating influence on the neighbouring land.’70 
Furthermore, for the European community the location of the Indian bazaar not 
only presented an evident public health risk, it also acted as a prominent reminder 
of the comparative growth of Indian power and aspirations. In 1910 it was 
estimated Indian political activist Jeevanjee owned over two thirds of the bazaar, 
making it even less surprising that the colonial government courted so many 
recommendations, including those of Williams and Simpson, to move it to 
somewhere less central and conspicuous.71 Furthermore, the financing proposed 
for Williams’ new Nairobi (his plans were estimated to cost £115,000) reveal the 
way the colonial government felt that Indians should be responsible for paying for 
any improvements. Why, Williams’s argued, should those who held no blame pay 
for the ‘unsanitary habits of a certain class’? Williams fleshed out his plan by 
recommending that the Municipal Authorities levied ‘special sanitary rates’ on 
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particularly blameworthy districts.72  
 
Since the earliest British colonial incursions, segregation of European populations 
from the indigenous majority ‘had been an accepted axiom in the planning and 
laying out of all towns in the tropics’ and was favoured in colonial India itself.73 
This preference in urban management had been prevalent since the turn of the 
century when respected medical experts sponsored by the Royal Society, J.W.W. 
Stephens and S.R. Christophers published support for it as the most effective 
means of avoiding malaria.74 Segregation had been enthusiastically embraced by 
Sir Frederick Lugard in Northern Nigeria (‘of all the governors of tropical 
Africa…the most thoroughgoing segregationist’75), who in 1912 passed wide 
reaching legislation that took fully on board Simpson’s recommendations at the 
1909 Accra conference on the matter.76 
 
In short, by the time Simpson came to visit East Africa in 1913 (hot on the heels of 
another plague outbreak between 1911-13), segregation, far from being a bolt 
from the blue, was a widely respected way to manage colonial urban spaces. 
Indeed, from the earliest plans for Nairobi, segregation was taken for granted and 
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was entirely in line with segregationist policies routinely deployed throughout 
Empire: most prominently in South Africa, India, China and the Pacific.77  
 
The rise and fall of segregation in Kenya—disaggregating communities in a 
plural society:  
In fact, despite all the excitement, Simpson’s recommendations were ultimately 
overthrown. The 1918 Segregation of Races Act did not get off the ground and 
segregation was not formally instated.78 The story of this journey—from the 
debates segregation stimulated, to the processes through which it was ultimately 
rejected—provide important insights into the lack of predictability in the 
allegiances of individual members of the multicultural colonial population. 
Dominant camps, broadly representative of collective standpoint positions, did 
exist—most crudely with Grogan and Delamere representing the settler leaders 
openly defiant against Indian ambitions, and the members of the EAINC, led by 
Jevanjee, working actively against segregation. Grogan’s position is particularly 
understandable when he is contextually understood as owning prime land in 
Nairobi by the river—giving him a clear vested interest in matters concerning 
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Nairobi town planning.79  Even so, despite obvious allegiances, when the details 
of events are exposed, it was sometimes surprising why segregation failed. In this 
particular story, it was those going against the grain of what might be construed as 
a stance ‘typical’ of their race, which changed the course of events. It was an 
Indian Municipal Council member who allowed the segregation bill to be carried 
forward within Nairobi circles and, when segregation teetered on the brink of 
becoming enshrined within the 1921 Public Health Act, it was Winston Churchill 
(who often adopted a very anti-Indian position) who ultimately stepped in and saw 
that the proposal was rejected. 
 
 
As David Arnold has argued, although in the context of colonial India, race was a 
‘nebulous and often self-contradictory concept’. Racial categories were convenient 
shorthand for one group of people with shared skin colour to name, and make 
assumptions about, another but they also had an important role to play in forging 
the self-identification of individuals and groups assuming shared characteristics.80 
This case study shows that in colonial Nairobi, Indians selectively adhered to the 
broad racial identifier ‘Indian’ when it suited their political agenda for collective 
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representation. However, in practice this was a fragile veneer of unity and the 
membership of the broad racial category was no guarantee of what side any 
individual might take in the segregation debates. Indians particularly, were far from 
being a cohesive community. As on the Subcontinent, Kenyan Indians comprised 
an extremely heterogeneous group representing different religions, sects, castes 
and languages. Additionally, individuals would have had different levels of wealth 
and education creating further subdivisions within communities. Contemporary 
visitors to East Africa described the Bohras (Muslim traders) Khojas (Shia 
Muslims), Parsis (Zoroastrians) and Vanias (Hindu traders). To these could be 
added the Lohanas, Punjabi Muslims, Oshwahlis, Patels, Sikhs, Kutchis, Goans 
and Punjabi Hindus, all with different traditions, diets, networks and employment 
patterns.81 Not that Indians were unique, however. As Will Jackson and Brett 
Shadle have shown, white Kenyans were also not a homogenous group, even if at 
times it was politically advantageous for them to seem to speak with a united 
voice.82 Shadle has particularly highlighted how settlers wrangled with the 
dilemma of wanting to speak and act as a united community, and yet also needed 
to defend their own private matters and spheres.83 
                                                
81 Richard F. Burton, Zanzibar, City, Island and Coast (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1872) 5-75; 
256-257; 326; 342; James Christie, Cholera Epidemics in East Africa: An Account of the Several 
Diffusions of the Disease in that Country from 1821 till 1872 (London: Macmillan 1876) 299-349; 
Greenwood and Topiwala, Indian Doctors in Kenya, 25-28 
82 Brett Shadle, The Souls of White Folk: White Settlers in Kenya, 1900-1920s (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2015); Jackson, Madness and Marginality 
83 Shadle, The Souls of White Folk 
 31 
 
The history of how events unfolded is indicative of the limitations of generalising 
racial responses. Shortly after its release, the Simpson report was reviewed 
several times at the Nairobi Municipal Committee between the middle of 1914 and 
the end of 1915. Eight European officials as well as two representatives of the 
Indian community (Dr Rosendo Ribeiro (the Goan representative) and Mr P.K. 
Ghandy (the Indian representative)) attended these sessions.84 Particularly 
contentious were the plans to move the Indian bazaar and a subcommittee was 
appointed to look into the implications of this aspect of Professor Simpson’s 
report.85 Finally, after much debate, it was agreed that relocation was neither 
financially (nor practically) expedient and the Municipal Council rejected the plans 
by Simpson to create an Indian area on the North side of the river at River Road. It 
effectively meant that Simpson’s vision of ‘absolute’ segregation had been 
deemed impossible, so—as a pragmatic concession—council members moved on 
to debate ‘whether a qualified segregation is practicable or desirable’.86 It was at 
this point in the proceedings that is can be seen that the two Indian council 
representatives were disunited in their position. While Ghandy vehemently stated 
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that he saw ‘no necessity for segregation as between Europeans and Asiatics’87, 
the other council member (and the medical expert no less) Dr Ribeiro was more 
accommodating, to the point that he decided not to vote against the clause.88  
 
When the final vote was passed, the Municipal Committee, whilst backing the 
general principle of segregation, stopped at directly supporting absolute 
segregation, declaring the full enactment too expensive to implement.89 Ever 
cognisant of economic considerations, it was recognised that the city survived on 
trade and, it was conceded, ‘contact between different races is an essential and 
inevitable feature of life in Nairobi.’90 In the moderated segregative vision 
proposed: ‘[e]ither race should be allowed to hold land and to trade in either zone: 
but as regards actual residence each race should be restricted to its own zone.’91 
 
Although ostensibly decided in these debates of 1915, the matter continued to be 
hotly debated over the next few years, not least as a new vocal Indian 
representative entered the fray to replace Ribeiro. J.M. Campos (also a Goan) 
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adopted a radically different stance on segregation to his predecessor. Between 
1915-1918, Campos overturned the damage Ribeiro’s failure to vote against 
segregation had done and, in stark contrast to Ribeiro’s preference to sit on the 
fence, vocally opposed the policies dictated by the European majority of the 
Committee. Why, Campos asked, did the government not create new hygienic 
areas for Indians, rather than just leave them in the slums?92  
 
The support for segregation was also reported in the Legislative Council Minutes, 
but with much less emphasis on Indian objections, presumably because the 
Governor had control over their content. The Legislative Council had only one 
nominated Indian representative (Mr Phadke) who was reported as ‘unavoidably 
absent’ when another segregation vote took place on 24 January 1921.93 The 
vote was recorded with only one sentence in the minutes as follows: ‘The question 
was fully debated and it was finally decided by a majority of 20 to 2’, the brevity of 
this mention underplays the significance of the debates that had passed before. 
Although Legislative Council members had decided to scrap segregation in their 
meeting only a few days before, the next time the council was convened, on 24 
January, members were said to face the ‘wrath’ of settler leader Lord Delamere 
who violently protested against the deletion of the segregation clause and 
persuaded other nominated members to reverse their previous votes. Although 
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little else is known about his stance, it was recorded in the minutes that European 
official McGregor Ross, was a loan European to oppose segregation, even though 
his view was ultimately overturned.94 Mr Phadke resigned his seat in direct protest 
against the decision after the vote was taken.95 
 
In the context of this local victory for segregation, the debate moved into British 
parliamentary circles. In 1920 EAINC members (led again by Jevanjee) made a 
formal appeal to Viscount Milner, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, against 
the ‘invidious, unjust and indefensible treatment’ of Indians in Kenya’.96 British 
parliamentarians were reminded by Jevanjee that the East Africa Protectorate 
owed its existence and success to ‘the resources of India and the enterprise, 
industry, and not least the sacrifice, of Indians’.97 The Indian delegation argued 
that segregation was ‘based on artificial ground’ because Indian areas had 
suffered through the culpable neglect of sanitary improvements on the part both of 
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the Administration and the Municipality’.98 
 
Although the Indian appeal was viewed with sympathy by some parliamentarians 
(such as Lord Islington), Secretary of State, Milner was unsupportive, expressing 
his view that the ‘spirit of exaggeration’ had tarnished debates.99 Milner reiterated 
the medical authority on which plans had been born, reminding his peers that 
Simpson was ‘the highest living authority on tropical sanitation.’100 Indians, he 
argued, ‘however highly educated and advanced’ could offer ‘no guarantee’ that 
they would ‘observe the necessary personal sanitary requirements which are 
essential for the safety of the European neighbours’.101 In short, Milner (although 
baulking at directly offering support for segregation –claiming he did not like the 
word), dug in his heels and stated his unequivocal endorsement of dividing 
townships into separate areas inhabited by different races. This arrangement he 
maintained was not only a social justice, but was the best pragmatic means to 
manage a plural society creating ‘social comfort, social convenience and social 
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peace’.102  
 
Subsequent to this firm pro-segregationist statement by Milner, Jeevanjee 
responded with a direct and impassioned appeal. In polite terms, he stated his 
objections to blame being put on his community, pointing out the broader, 
structural problems that had created such a situation. Jeevanjee enclosed with his 
letter a copy of a memorandum he had prepared in 1915 entitled ‘Sanitation in 
Nairobi’ in which he explained the poor sanitation of the marketplace not on any 
cultural propensity towards filthy habits, but because of ‘the culpable negligence of 
sanitary improvements by both the administration and the Municipality.’103 Further 
proof of the government’s negligence, Jeevanjee argued, lay in the fact that they 
had ignored Williams ‘very able report’ of 1907.104  
 
The debates that occurred after Simpson show prominent members of the Indian 
community defending themselves against the Kenyan colonial government. But it 
would be too simplistic to imagine that all Indians spoke in one voice—the very 
fact that the bill got so far within Kenyan Council chambers, was partly to do with 
the failure to vote against it by one prominent Indian Municipal Council member, 
Dr Ribeiro. Furthermore, it would be wrong to claim that the bazaar was not dirty or 
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in need of hygienic reform. Pictures taken to illustrate the Simpson Report clearly 
show open sewers, cramped living quarters and amassed filth.105 In the bazaar 
building plots were extremely small, each house being only allocated 50 feet by 75 
feet meaning that there were about 12 houses to the acre, which was the 
‘minimum area admissible in English cities’.106 As late as 1928 the Annual Medical 
Report for the colony was still reporting the bazaar’s terrible sanitary state, stating 
that in this area ‘even the rats die of plague’.107 Indeed, the story is further 
complicated by the knowledge that some of the most vocal complaints against the 
sanitary conditions of the bazaar came from within the Indian community itself. 
Indian doctors, as late as the 1930s, were particularly shocked and frustrated by 
the habits of some segments of the Indian population in the township bazaars, 
declaring them to be ‘ignorant as well as being prejudiced against change’.108 
Other Indian leaders, sensitive to Europeans scapegoating the whole community, 
were vociferous in demands for the severest punishment to Indians who were 
prosecuted for breach of sanitary regulations.109 Educated Indians, in particular, 
were keen to distance themselves from those uneducated shopkeepers and 
tradesmen who seemed to be responsible for flouting western sanitary principles.  
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Similarly curious was the fact that campaigning against segregation did not 
necessarily mean an anti-imperial stance. It was notable that the language EAINC 
members routinely used in their appeal was respectful, even proud, of their status 
as British subjects. Even Jeevanjee, in the period before 1911, although claiming 
British policy towards the Indian community in Kenya had been ‘suicidal’, went out 
of his way to stress his allegiance, describing himself as ‘a loyal subject of the 
King…proud to be a citizen of the British Empire’.110  
 
The ultimate rejection of segregation came from an intervention from an unlikely 
candidate: Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State to the Colonies. Churchill, in 
his career up until that point, had been no friend of the Indians. In 1910 he 
declared his objective to make Kenya ‘a white man’s country’, identifying 
specifically ‘the brown man…[as] the rival’.111 Though Churchill had in his 1907 
travelogue written about how impressed he had been by Indian contributions, only 
a few year’s later Churchill referred to Indians as the ‘nightmare which haunts the 
white population of Africa’, disrupting the colonial order by their economic 
interventions in East Africa, and taking jobs from the Europeans.112  
 
Yet, despite this declared position, which would seem to anticipate opposition to 
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Indians in their segregation debates, it was Churchill who opposed the final 
ratification of segregation in the 1921 Public Health Act.113 In Kenya, Lord 
Delamere had led a fierce attack on the proposal to remove the segregation 
clause, Clause Fifteen, from the new Public Health Act.114 Early on in the debates, 
the Principal Medical Officer, John Langton Gilks, had expressed his opinion that 
public health issues in the non-European areas could be resolved by adequate 
sanitary regulations alone.115 The settler backlash to this statement within the 
Legislative Council was heavy, with one settler attacking Gilks for not being ‘in the 
class of Simpson’, thereby offending his medical credentials. The pressure was 
evidently too much for Gilks—and he quickly capitulated with the words ‘I cannot 
say anything as the Committee is against me’.116 As a direct result of settler 
pressure, the motion to delete Clause Fifteen was defeated by 20 to 1 and the fight 
to keep segregation seemed won.117  
 
However, despite this local settler victory, Churchill rejected the proposal. The 
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reasons why he made the decision are seen in a series of exchanges between 
Churchill and the Governor, who was lobbying Churchill to adopt a position more 
in tune with settler demands. Churchill stated that he could not support 
segregation within the broader context of increasing parliamentary and India 
Office sensitivity on the ‘Indian Question’, which had been generated through 
escalating contemporaneous debates on the parity of rights of all citizens of the 
British Empire. Churchill had also seen the controversy sparked by South African 
experiments with segregation, so with these pressures at the forefront of his mind, 
made sure that the segregation clause was entirely deleted before the Public 
Health Bill received Royal assent.118 Churchill was explicit in his position opposing 
the Governor of Kenya, and his settler supporters, through stating that ‘the 
principle of segregation is unnecessarily wounding to Indian sentiment’.119 
Churchill went on to say that legal penalties should be used to punish those within 
the Indian community who did not conform to ‘civilised European’ standards and 
that this might be enough to enforce informal segregation with ‘Indians preferring 
to live in the Indian quarters where such a high standard will not be exacted.’120  
 
After this decisive defeat in terms of its inclusion within public health legislature, it 
was no surprise that segregation failed to get into the Devonshire Declaration of 
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1923. Instead, the Devonshire Declaration upheld the new British governmental 
stance on segregation and, in a remarkable departure from the formerly steadfast 
reliance on Simpson, stated ‘segregation of Europeans and Asiatics is not 
absolutely essential for the preservation of the health of the community’.121 
 
Segregation in practice: 
The battle to fight Simpson’s proposals of segregation may have been won but, 
disappointingly, this concession, once achieved, was a something of a damp squib. 
The Public Health Act and the Devonshire Declaration made little tangible 
difference to the arrangement of urban life along racial lines in the colonial capital, 
not least as Europeans, Indians and Africans all lived in the city in entirely 
separate spheres. In the early incarnation of Nairobi, as a railway depot, it has 
been argued that racial boundaries appeared to have been quite fluid. Indeed, 
Murunga maintained that ‘class rather than racial differences’ determined the way 
the early railway settlement was organised; with officers living separate from 
workers, but with white labourers and Indian ‘coolies’ residing in close proximity 
and sharing facilities.122 Whether this assessment of the social arrangements of 
the earliest days was true or not, the city of Nairobi, as its population and 
infrastructure developed, quickly divided into racial zones, with or without the help 
of formal legislation.  
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This is not to say that the price of land, the selective selling of prime locations to 
settlers, and the award of land grants only to Europeans, did not perpetuate a 
situation that favoured social separateness between the different racial 
communities. Additionally, until 1963, the majority of Kenyan schools and 
hospitals remained emphatically segregated; creating a situation whereby it would 
be impractical for Indians to move to an area where important infrastructures were 
barred to them.  These obstinate structural hurdles, however, should be 
recognised as also working in tandem with the apparent cultural preference 
demonstrated by the vast majority of each community to live separately. Together 
these dynamics created a situation where the opportunity to deviate from this 
norm, in terms of urban social arrangement, became almost impossible. 
 
Sana Aiyar has argued for the allegiances between Africans and Indians in terms 
of a shared agenda towards independence. While her work offers valuable 
insights into previously unconsidered examples of cross-racial cohesion, at the 
same time it rather underplays how, practically speaking, most communities lived 
in separate enclaves.123 Several Indian leaders of the EAINC, most notably A.M. 
Jeevanjee and later, with even more impact, Manilal Desai, campaigned vocally 
for the outlawing of segregation, yet the uncomfortable, and somewhat ironic, 
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reality was that most Indians did nothing to actively change social segregation 
through their choices to dwell and work in ways that primarily faced their own 
communities.  
 
Words contained within the Devonshire Report provide significant insight. 
Devonshire anticipated that the lack of formal backing for segregation would mean 
little in practice. ‘[I]t may well prove that in practice the different races will, by a 
natural affinity keep together in separate quarters’ he stated with some pertinent 
insight.124 Devonshire was not alone: a handwritten comment on an internal 
Colonial Office memo of the period is revealing: tacit support to the continued 
practices of segregation could be provided as long as a way could be found ‘of 
avoiding official correspondence’ on the subject.125 Despite all the campaigning 
against segregation, it was a deeply entrenched, tacitly accepted, even favoured, 
way of urban residential organisation for Nairobi residents. Tellingly, at late as 
1948, South African architect L.W. Thornton, when commissioned to submit 
designs for European estates in Nairobi, produced a map of the city’s population 
distribution showing how populations continued to live in their own communities.126 
Furthermore, given the alleged innate propensity of most Indians to live in squalor, 
the report let the government off the hook from any large expenditure, by 
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rationalising that it was useless to impose any broader infrastructural 
improvements in Nairobi while this unsatisfactory state of affairs existed. As such, 
as late as 1948, the arrangement of separating communities into separate spheres 
was tacitly endorsed. 127 
 
It is argued that the Simpson Report only suggested ratifying and justifying a 
situation that already existed de facto in colonial Nairobi and, furthermore, 
continued to exist right up until independence. As Governor Northey described in 
1921: ‘Indians did not desire to live among Europeans if they could have 
opportunities of living among Indians’.128 Great efforts were made by Indian 
leaders to overturn plans to segregate Nairobi, yet the central tension remains that, 
formally ratified or not, Nairobi was a city arranged along segregated lines before 
this battle commenced and continued to be so after it had been successfully won.  
 
Conclusion: 
The segregation debates illustrate how race was the principal, but not the only, 
determinant of one’s side of allegiance in the segregation debates. Europeans did 
not speak in one voice and neither did Indians, or Africans. Only a few privileged 
members of the Indian community were in a position to speak out against 
segregation, or even vote against it, but these were individuals with their own 
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personal belief systems and allegiances and their opinions towards segregation 
were not always as might be expected. On the far right of the political spectrum, 
Churchill, despite all his proclamations displaying antipathy towards the Kenyan 
Indian community, was the authority that finally went against settler demands and 
insisted that the segregation clause was deleted from the first draft of the Public 
Health Act. 
 
The Simpson Report is therefore less interesting historically as a novel piece of 
colonial legislation, than it is as a case study in the way key members of the 
Kenyan colonial government, and its settler supporters, medically justified their 
progressive erosion of the political and economic agency of Kenyan Indians. The 
case also shows the paradox of a community campaigning for parity and 
integration, whilst also acting in ways that could be cast as separate and enclavist. 
As colonial administrator in Burma, John Sydenham Furnivall (1878-1960) 
declared in his early exposition of the problems of multiculturalism, plural societies 
of Empire where more brittle than they were cohesive. Furnivall bemoaned the 
limits to integration stating that different races ‘mix but do not combine. Each 
group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and 
ways’.129  
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Drawing attention to the language of public health to justify segregation in colonial 
Kenya, via the Simpson Report, helps us to form a more nuanced and deeper 
understanding of the complex histories of plural societies. The diverse 
demographic make-up of a prominent colonial city, such as Nairobi, presented 
grave problems to the colonial administration and forced it to articulate a vision of 
colonial urban organisation. Nairobi, a city of migrants created for colonial 
purposes, had to find its identity and each community had a different vision of what 
it should look like.  During the early period in the life of the colony, Africans were 
the least able to gain access to public debates or legal rights, and although the 
majority population were not the focus of this article, they nevertheless should not 
be forgotten in the story.130 If their story were similarly accessed (although 
regrettably sources are few), it is anticipated that the same lack of predictable 
uniformity in responses may be seen, as well as a comprehensible cultural 
preference for living within their own sub-communities. 
 
Different groups, for different ends, used arguments for and against segregation 
rhetorically. For Simpson segregation, was a way of cleaning up the image of the 
Nairobi and ensuring its future status as a showcase imperial capital,131 
Jeevanjee, on the other hand, felt that Nairobi’s geographic location ultimately 
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restricted it to be a commercial hub, so it was better developed as a ‘place of retail 
and trade’. Segregation, for Jeevanjee, was a European ploy to further curb Indian 
economic success in the region.132 It was also conveniently selective. As 
Jeevanjee pointed out: the authorities kept ‘the white men away from those 
[houses] of the Indians on the ground of danger from plague, but the Indian 
domestic servants are allowed to live with the white men in the same premises.’133  
 
Ultimately this paper has made three points. First, it shows how, despite claims of 
its ground-breaking originality, and the authority in which it was unmistakeably 
held, the Simpson Report did not appear out of thin air and, in fact built on long 
standing associations elsewhere in Empire, as well as simultaneously occurring 
battles, to reduce the agency of Indians in Kenya. Although it was claimed that 
Simpson had come to his conclusions objectively and was ‘sent out there [East 
Africa] not with any reference to the question of Indian or European ownership or 
residence at all’, that was plainly not the case.134 Second, highlighting the battles 
over segregation provides a case study as to how plural societies were arranged 
with battle lines defined broadly, but not absolutely, by skin colour. European 
doctors used the authority of public health to provide respectability to racist 
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policies. Finally, the paper has shown how segregation was a battle of principle 
much more than it was an argument about fundamentally changing the way 
society was organised. These three points show the complex political, social and 
cultural undercurrents that competed in the development of colonial Nairobi as its 
black, white and brown inhabitants strove, albeit on unequal terms, to have a voice 
in moulding the space in which they found themselves living together. 
